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Abstract. Machine learning is successful in many applications including securing a network from unseen attack. The application of learning 
algorithm for detecting anomaly in a network has been fundamental since few years. With increasing use of machine learning techniques, it has 
become important to study to what extent it is good to be dependent on them. Altogether a different discipline called ‘adversarial learning’ have 
come up as a separate dimension of study. The work in this paper is to test the robustness of online machine learning based IDS to carefully 
crafted packets by the attacker called poison packets. The objective is to observe how a remote attacker can deviate the normal behavior of 
machine learning based classifier in the IDS by injecting the network with carefully crafted packets externally, that may seem normal by the 
classification algorithm and the instance made part of its future training set. This behavior eventually can lead to a poisoned learning by the 
classification algorithm in the long run, resulting in misclassification of true attack instances. This work explores one such approach with SOM 
and SVM as the online learning-based classification algorithms. 
Keywords: Adversarial learning; Machine learning; Poison learning; Intrusion Detection System; Artificial Intelligence, NSL-KDD Dataset, 
SVM, support vectors.
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems (IDS/IPS) are 
one of the critical components of the network of an 
organization or an institution. Even though IDS involving 
machine learning have not been of much practical 
considerations in a real network but still they have proven 
effective to withstand future unseen attacks. Much of the 
research work have also been focused on detecting online 
network attacks apart from detecting off line attacks by 
analyzing the log data or offline data. Till date several IDS 
systems are designed and developed based on many different 
machine learning techniques. Most of these techniques are used 
as a classifier to normal and attack packets. Literature study 
also portrays that some IDS are based on single learning 
techniques such as Genetic Algorithm, Artificial Neural 
Network etc, while most others involve multiple learning 
involving the process of ensemble techniques. However, the 
accuracy of such learning algorithms depends on the type and 
amount of training data considered. Bio inspired algorithms are 
also coming up in recent times [48,49,53]. Recently online 
statistical machine learning has also become an important and 
useful approach to IDS. In such cases the learning is 
periodically retrained on the online data for better classification 
results i.e. every new incoming packet is initially classified by 
the classifier either as normal or anomaly. If the packet turns 
out to be normal than it becomes part of future training set. 
This behavior of learning has been exploited by adversaries 
very well. The adversaries with minimum knowledge of the 
training data set used crafted data in such a way that the 
classifier may treat it as normal but in the long run may lead to 
a poison attack. In this paper the proposed model of online IDS 
by Lee, Seungmin, Gisung Kim et.al [1] have been adopted as 
a part of study due to high accuracy claim and is tested on 
NSL KDD data set [2]. The model was later subjected to 
poison learning and results were analyzed.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines 
different machine learning techniques used in IDS. Section 3 
outlines challenges of using machine learning. Section 4 
outlines the taxonomy of attacks against IDS. Section 5 
outlines the referred model. Section 6 outlines the proposed 
framework and algorithm. Section 7 discusses the 
experimental setup, results and analysis. Section 8 proposes a 
mathematical equation representation corresponding to the 
number of crafted poison instances.  Section 9 discuss the 
class imbalance consideration followed by Section 10 that 
discuss the proposed solution that addresses the presented 
problem and finally followed by conclusion in Section 11. 
2. Popular machine learning techniques used in IDS 
2.1 Artificial Neural Network 
Artificial Neural Network is information processing unit 
which mimic the neurons of human brain [3]. An Artificial 
Neural Network consists layer of neurons categorized into 
input, hidden and output layer [4]. The neural network IDS 
trained on KDD data set have following three phases [5]. 
a) Automated parsers to transform raw TCP/IP data into set of 
vector values fed as input to the neural model. 
b) Training: Neural Network model is trained on different 
network ‘normal’ and ‘attack’ values. Input corresponding 
to KDD data set have 41 features and the output 
corresponds to either attack (22 different types) or normal. 
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c) Testing: Validation on the Test Data for further enhancing 
the neural model for better classification. Different 
validation technique such as k-cross validation is adopted at 
different times. 
Some of the recent work using Artificial Neural Network can 
be found in the following papers [14,15,16]. 
2.2 Support Vector Machines 
Developed by Cortes & Vapnik originally for learning two 
class discriminant functions from a set of training examples. 
SVM basically features the following [6,7]. 
a) Class separation: Seek for the optimal plane that separates 
the points of the two planes also known as support vectors 
by maximum distance. 
b) Overlapping classes: The influence of data points falling on 
the wrong side of the planes are weighted down. 
c) Non-linearity: The data points that cannot be distinctly 
separated linearly are transformed into a higher dimensional 
plane where they become separable. 
d) Problem Solution: Representing the entire task as quadratic 
optimization problem that that becomes solvable by some 
known techniques. 
Some of the recent work using SVM in IDS can be found in the 
following papers [17,18,19]. 
2.3 Self Organizing Map 
  This learning is inspired from biological neural model 
like that of ANN. However, it involves both competitive 
and correlative learning [8]. Whenever an input is 
presented to the network model, the neurons compete 
among themselves and the neuron with closest similarity 
claims the input and becomes the winner. The winner 
strengthens his weight with the input. This mechanism 
spreads to neighbors in Gaussian distribution. The core 
objective is to reduce the dimension of data visualization. 
Some of the recent work using SOM In IDS can be found 
in the following papers [20,21,22]. 
2.4 Decision Trees 
  Given a set of instances, Decision tree classify the 
instances by sorting them down the tree starting from the 
root and ending in a leaf of the tree.  An attribute of an 
instance is represented as a node of the tree and each 
branch descending from the node corresponds to one of 
the possible values of the attribute. This type of learning 
is mostly used in cases where instances can be 
represented by set of attribute and value pairs,  the output 
of the target function is not continuous and map to a 
discrete set of values, considerations of possible errors in 
the training set and missing values in the training 
set[9].Some of the recent work using Decision Tree in 
IDS can be found in the following papers [23,24,25]. 
2.5 Naive Bayes Classifier 
Naïve Bayes Classifier is a probabilistic classifier. This 
type of classifier outputs a value p(y|x) i.e probability of 
y given x. The computation can be done in two ways. 
Firstly, learning and applying the function that computes 
the class posterior (y|x) and this is called a discriminative 
process, because  given set of instances it 
discriminates between different classes. The other 
alternative is to learn the class conditional density p(x|y) 
for each value of y and to learn the class priors p(y), then 
one can apply the Bayes rule to compute the posterior 
[10]. The above is called generative model because for 
each possible class y, the feature vector x is generated. 
The advantage of using classifiers with probabilistic 
output are “reject option”, where the classification is 
refused if the prediction is uncertain , “changing utility 
function” , where risk can be minimized by combining 
the probability distribution with an utility function, 
“compensating for class imbalance”, where one class is 
rare than the other(scaled likelihood trick).Some of the 
recent work using Naive Bayes in IDS can be found in 
the following papers [26,27,28]. 
 
2.6 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic uses a membership function to indicate 
degree of belonging of an attribute to a more than one 
class. It is difficulty to draw a strict boundary between 
normal and attack and hence instances can be assigned 
varying degree of normal or attack and for this reason 
fuzzy is a big choice for designing Intrusion Detection 
System. With fuzzy it becomes possible to model small 
deviations to keep false positives/negatives small. The 
generic form of the fuzzy rule can be represented as 
follows 
  IF condition THEN conclusion [weight]. 
 Condition is fuzzy expression defined using fuzzy logic 
operators fuzzy AND etc, conclusion is an atomic 
expression and weight is a set of real number [0,1], that 
portrays the confidence of the rule [11]. Some of the 
recent work using Fuzzy systems in IDS can be found in 
the following papers [29,30,31]. 
2.7 Radial Basis Function  
Radial Function are altogether a different type of function 
where the response decreases or increases monotonically 
with distance from a point of reference or central point.  
  
Fig 1: Each component in input vector feed to m basis functions and whose 
outputs are linearly combined. 
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 One example of such function is Gaussian as shown below. 
h(x) = exp (-(x-c)2/r2), where c is the center and r is the 
radius. 
 Radial basis function network (RBF) are associated with 
radial functions as shown below in the figure 1 [12]. 
Some of the recent work using Radial Basis Function in 
IDS can be found in the following papers [32,22,34]. 
2.8 K Means Clustering  
  This algorithm is used to classify objects into ‘k’ number 
of clusters, based on common features of the objects. The 
similarity value is computed by considering and 
minimizing the sum of squares of distances between data 
points and the corresponding cluster centroid [13]. Some 
of the recent work using k Means clustering in IDS can 
be found in the following papers [35,36,37] 
3. CHALLENGES IN  USING MACHINE LEARNING 
Machine Learning has proved to be result promising and 
many companies such as Amazon uses machine learning for 
meeting different objectives. However, the success of using 
machine learning depends on lot of factors of which few are 
listed below. 
3.1 Training Data (Explicit and Implicit) 
Training data used in a learning algorithm can be broadly 
newly categorized into implicit feedback data and explicit 
feedback data.  In explicit feedback data, feature vector 
corresponding to a message packet is explicitly confirmed as 
an attack or normal without much difficulty, and 
correspondingly used to train the learning algorithm. However, 
in implicit feedback, data features might not be possible to 
immediately be classified as normal or anomaly because more 
attributes value might resemble a normal data but overall 
feature vector or set of features vector might correspond to an 
anomaly. Such “critical tag” need to be considered with utmost 
care.  
3.2 High Cost Errors 
Running an IDS with even a very small rate of false 
classification might come with high risk to the organization or 
institution. Falsely classified as Negative might end up in a 
remote machine gaining access to the internal network and 
thereby rendering the entire network nonfunctional. The 
objective would be to design learning algorithms that could 
ideally make “False Positive” and “False Negative” parameters 
approximately approach to zero value. 
3.3 Rule Generation  
For a message or for a given source whose feature vector is 
classified as abnormal it is critical to judge whether the 
abnormality corresponds to an attack or a behavior deviating 
from normal but not an attack. More critical in such cases is 
automatic rule generation corresponding the feature set of the 
message or originating source. 
3.4 Proper interpretation of traffic over time.   
The variability in the network traffic parameters such as 
volume of traffic, bandwidth consumption, duration of 
connections, number of connections can make things more 
critical in operational environment. Adding to the mentioned 
facts diversity can also be on the application parameters of the 
messages, nature of protocols and attribute values of different 
headers fields. Question arises here is the duration for which a 
given connection or the network should be monitored or how 
long duration traffic should be aggregated for evaluation. 
Application layer DoS attack occurs in slow rate and don’t 
generate massive amount of traffic. 
3.5 Data set Hindrance.   
The data set that are publicly available such as KDD Cup 
1999, NSL-KDD [38,39] are almost a decade old. Learning 
algorithms are still trained on these existing old data sets which 
fails to incorporate feature vector of recent attacks such as 
RUDY[R-U-Dead-Yet]. The alternative could be repository of 
self-monitored network. However, this could be a complicated 
task due to non-accessibility to an appropriately sized network. 
4. ATTACKS AGAINST MACHINE LEARNING BASED IDS 
Even though Machine Learning algorithms have been 
successful in proving better results, however they are never 
always secure [59]. An adversary might always seek to explore 
loopholes for rendering the learning by the algorithm futile. 
The following outlines properties for analyzing attacks against 
Machine Learning based IDS as discussed in [41,54].  
A. Influence 
(a) Causative  
(b) Exploratory 
B. Security Violation 
(a) Integrity 
(b) Availability 
(c) Privacy 
C. Specificity 
(a) Targeted 
(b) Indiscriminate 
 
The entire model of securing learning algorithms can be 
framed as a game between the attacker and the learning model. 
The attacker can poison the learning by manipulating the 
training instances.  
 
Causative Attack: In this type of attack the adversary 
influences the training instances [60]. The degree of influence 
over the attributes of the data may vary based on the amount 
of access an attacker might have. If the attacker is aware of the 
truth that online instances are considered by the learning for 
evolution, he can exploit this fact and frame instances 
accordingly to gradually deviate the learning towards miss 
classification. ‘Allergy’ attack, ‘Red herring’ attacks are few 
to be mentioned.  
 
Exploratory Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker crafts 
intrusions to successfully evade the classifier. Here the direct 
influence on the classifier is not performed. Here the attributes 
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of normal traffic are exploited to form attack vector 
mimicking a normal vector. If the newly framed vector is 
successful in evading the classifier, then therein lies the 
consequences. It might so happen that the classifier considers 
this new instance for future learning and as a result eventually, 
the learning of the classifier can be deviated from the normal 
value.  
5. REFERRED MODEL 
The literature survey demonstrates numerous contributions on 
using machine learning techniques for successful intrusion 
detection. Some of the latest work can be found in [42, 43, 44, 
45]. In our first work, we have adopted a section of the model 
proposed in [46]. The authors in the paper have proposed a 
novel framework for fully unsupervised training and online 
anomaly detection. Initially a model is constructed and 
eventually the model evolves with the status of online data. 
Fig. 2 shows the overview of the proposed model. The 
framework consists of three phases. The first phase consists of 
training the classification algorithm. In this phase the weight 
vector of a synaptic connection is adjusted by injecting the 
training set as input. 
 
 
Fig 2: Proposed Framework by Lee et.al in [46]. 
 
  Once there is a wining neuron, the corresponding weight 
of the neuron and its neighbors defined by a neighborhood 
function is updated. In the second phase, the weight vector of 
the matured SOM is clustered, and the centroid of an attack 
cluster is updated resulting in change in the boundary of the 
clusters. In the final phase, the normal is further split into a 
new attack cluster. The three phases are described below. 
Phase 1:  Remodeling the Network Structure and Size 
Whenever a new instance is fed as input, the Euclidean 
distance of the input vector with the all the weight vectors is 
computed. Whichever neuron has this minimum value, 
becomes the winning neuron.  
If | x - WBMU | < µ , 
 Where µ is the distance threshold. 
If the above situation holds, the weights of the winning neuron 
and its neighbors are updated as follows 
Wj(t+1) = Wj(t) + ή {x- Wj(t)}               (1) 
Where ή is the learning rate and decreases monotonically with 
time. 
The wining neuron (BMU-Best Matching Unit) if it belongs to 
a normal cluster, the data falls out to be normal and vice versa.   
Phase 2: Updating the centroid of the attack cluster 
In this phase the centroid of the attack cluster is updated if the 
following condition is met. 
 
i.e. the sum of the difference of the weight at a given time ‘t’ 
and the initial time t0 exceeds threshold value θ and ‘m’ is the 
number of units belonging to the attack cluster. 
Phase 3: Splitting the normal cluster 
If nth vector is represented by xn and ‘B’ represent a Normal 
cluster. Let B1 and B2 represent the split cluster from B.  Let µi 
be the centroid of the cluster ‘i’ and “N’ represent the recent 
data points that are at a distance greater than distance λ from µB. 
From the direction of attack clusters, if the direction of the 
number of data located is different and covers a portion ‘y’ of 
N, then k-means clustering with value of k=2 is executed on 
the normal cluster ‘B’ when SS1/SS2  > β. 
Here SS1 = ΣXn€ B | xn - µB|2 and  
SS2 = Σxn€ B1| xn - µB1|2 + Σxn€ B2| xn - µB2|2   
The results after implementation of the said model were 
promising and is shown in the below figure. 
 
 
 
Fig 3: Result of the offline model trained on SOM. 
6. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK  
Adopting as inspiration the model referred in section V, the 
proposed model of implementation is shown below. The 
proposed work is divided into the following phases: (i) 
Preprocessing the dataset (ii) Developing the training model 
and (iii) Poisoning the learned model. 
(i) Preprocessing the dataset. 
The dataset adopted for training and testing is NSL-KDD. 
NSL-KDD have following advantage over KDD dataset 
a) Due to absence of redundant item in the dataset, the 
learning does not become biased. 
b) The number of selected records of each type of attack is 
proportional to the number of records in KDD’99. 
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In the first phase the dataset is preprocessed and made 
ready for training the learning model namely SOM & SVM. 
When the training set is ready, the learning model is adopted in 
the second phase and is trained by using the training set. Once 
the learning is matured, then it is tested with poison instances 
in the third phase. The proposed work flow of training the 
models is shown in the Figure 4. NSL-KDD dataset have 
several non-numeric attribute values. Non-numeric data cannot 
be adopted for training the adopted learning models. Therefore, 
the non-numeric data is first transformed into numeric 
representation and the dataset is made ready for training. 
Random number of lines from the KDD dataset is adopted as 
part of the training set.  The column attributes are normalized 
and mapped into the interval [0,1] using min-max 
normalization approach. SOM is used in numerical value and 
in the same range. The equation for min-max normalization 
used is 
Z = x-max(x)/{max(x) – min(x)} 
(ii) Developing the Training Model 
The proposed algorithm for training the model is shown in 
Figure 6. The corresponding flow chart representation is shown 
in Figure 4. As shown in Algorithm, the input is the training set 
and the output is the learned model. Every instance from the 
training set is retrieved, preprocessed and later becomes a part 
of final training set. Once the training set is ready, either of the 
learning model can be adopted for training. If the learning 
model adopted is SOM, a grid of size 20x20 units is created 
and the units are initialized with random weight values. For 
every wining unit, the corresponding weight is updated as 
shown in the Algorithm. The above process continuous until 
the map is converged. Whereas, if the learning model is SVM, 
a kernel function is selected for training the model. In Fig 6 the 
linear kernel approach is shown. In such approach the objective 
is to find the linear hyperplane such that the support vectors of 
both the class are maximally separated out from each other. 
(iii) Poisoning the learning model 
The proposed algorithm for poisoning the learning model is 
shown in Fig 7. The corresponding flow chart representation is 
shown in Figure 5. Scapy is used to build custom packets and 
these packets are injected into the real network traffic. The IDS 
sensor running in the network captures these packets for further 
processing. The feature vector of each packet is extracted and 
fed to the classification algorithm. If the feature vector of the 
extracted packet is classified as 'Normal', the feature is added  
to the existing training set and becomes part of future training. 
If it is classified as an attack it is discarded. 
The attribute values of anomaly instances in NSL-KDD is 
observed and packets are framed accordingly. Most of the other 
attributes value resembles that of normal feature set. This is 
done to observe the change in behavior of the classification 
process and variance in the detection rate and other parameters.  
In Fig 7, w is the set of instances. Every instance from w is 
preprocessed and added to the training set T until T is ready. 
Once T is ready, the learning algorithm is chosen in step 5. Tm 
is the final trained model. The attacker crafts a packet Tp and 
injects it into the network. If Tm is classified as normal, it 
becomes part of future training set T. 
Game theory formulation: To ensure a high secure 
behavior in machine learning based IDS, the learning 
algorithm and its classification behavior can be portrayed as a 
game between the attacker and the defender. Let the attacker’s 
interest of corrupted training and evaluated data be Atrain and 
Aeval.  
 
Fig 4: Training the learning model 
 
Fig 5: Proposed flow chart for poison learning 
The game can be formulated as follows: 
1. Defender: Select a learning algorithm H that can be 
observed as best against the observed data. 
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2. Attacker: Generate compromised Atrain and Aeval. 
3. For learning: 
a) Receive dataset Dtrain with contamination from Atrain. 
b) Learn Hypothesis f <-- Dtrain 
4. Evaluation: 
a) Receive dataset Deval for evaluation of ‘f’ with 
or without any contamination Aeval+. 
b) If the classification error rate is less than 
threshold accept Deval and may be considered for 
future training.    
 
Fig 6: Algorithm for training the learning model 
7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The different languages and packages used for 
implementation are as follows: Python version 2 & 3, Scikit 
python package and Ubuntu 14. 
The experimental approach is divided into the following 
phases: 
(a) Train SOM and SVM and test the classification result. 
(b) Poison SOM and SVM with crafted instances and observe 
the variance in the result from the first phase 
 
The experiment was carried out in a LAN framework as 
shown in Figure 8. In Figure 8, the IDS sensor is the system 
running machine learning based IDS software. The attacker is 
assumed to get hold of host pc0 and pc1. The maliciously 
crafted packets are injected from pc0 and pc1 into the real time 
traffic of the network. In the first phase of the experiment, a 
SOM grid of size 20x20 is initialized and trained on NSL-KDD 
dataset until the SOM grid is converged. For every input unit 
the BMU (Best Matching Unit) is recorded. 
 
 
Fig 7: Proposed method for poisoning online learning 
 These BMU’s are later clustered into 20 different clusters 
which universally is mapped into either a normal or an attack 
cluster. Fig 9 shows the visual plane of weight vectors after 
being trained with NSL KDD Data set. Different colours of the 
weight vectors indicate the different clusters to which they fall. 
This output is on Normal Training data i.e. before subjecting to 
poison learning. The proposed flow chart to fail the model is 
portrayed in Fig 5. As seen in the proposed model poison 
instances are crafted by exhibiting the property “camouflage” 
i.e. normal instances vectors are picked up and their attributes 
values are varied in accordance with the value set of attack 
vectors. 
 
Fig 8: Experimental set up 
 
  The set of attributes that attacker picks up and can influence 
externally are shown in Figure 10. Once the attacker crafts 
packet instance that seemingly looks normal but eventually in 
the long run may lead to a poison attack.  These packets are 
injected into the IDS sensor. It was observed that the IDS 
sensor classified these instances as normal and therefore, 
makes them part of future training set. 
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Fig. 9.  3D plane of the BMU falling in different clusters [Normal Data] 
 
The attacker exploits this behavior and gradually mislead the 
learning towards miss classification of true instances One 
example of tampered attribute is such as Column 26 of NSL 
KDD - serror_rate (% of connections that have ‘SYN’ errors 
to the same host).  Table 1 illustrates the result of a normal 
SOM on NSL-KDD dataset. The accuracy of the detection is 
85%. It is important to note here that our objective is not to 
improve on the accuracy but to observe if this accuracy value 
could be influenced by poison learning.   Fig 9 shows the 
orientation of the BMU in SOM grid. Initially, the SOM is 
influenced by changing one random attribute from Fig 10.  
 
 
Fig 10: Attribute list that attacker can influence externally 
 
The attribute value is eventually changed to values that are 
observed in attack instances of NSL-KDD dataset. The crafted 
instance is initially injected into the IDS sensor. The IDS 
classify the instance as normal as seen in Table 4. The set 
attack cluster is empty indicating the instance is classified as 
normal. This instance become part of future training set. Fig 
10 demonstrated the fact of the re-orientation of the BMU 
after poison learning. Here, one random attribute of the normal 
instances is modified with the corresponding values of the 
attack set vectors. Fig 11 demonstrates the orientation of the 
BMU after four random attribute poison learning by the 
normal vectors with attack set values.  
 
 
Fig. 10. 3D plane of the BMU falling in different clusters [After poison 
learning with one random manipulated normal attribute with attack set values.] 
 
Table 1 shows the result of training the SOM in normal 
circumstances. Normal circumstances here imply that the 
training instances are non-tampered i.e. the feature vector set 
used for training belongs to true normal and attack instances. 
The size of the SOM grid is 20x20 units and as stated earlier 
the weights are assigned randomly until the SOM grid is 
converged with training instances. The testing instances are 
than fed to the SOM grid. An output unit in the SOM grid 
claims responsibility of the input instances and therefore 
becomes the winning unit i.e. BMU (Best Matching Unit). In 
our experiment the weight vectors connecting the input unit to 
the output units of the SOM grid are clustered into twenty 
numbers after the training phase. Each of these clusters either 
falls into attack or normal cluster. The category of the cluster 
is determined by the supervised label of the training instances. 
A BMU corresponding a training instance marked attack is 
part of the attack cluster.   
 
Table 1: Implementation results of normal SOM 
 
Number of training instances 3000  
Execution time with mentioned 
hardware and software details 
35 hours 
Total cluster into which weight 
vectors of SOM is clustered 
20 
 
Cluster indices that are part of attack. 
Each cluster consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[0,2,3,5,7,8,10,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17,18,19] 
Cluster indices that are part of normal. 
Each cluster consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[9,4,6,12] 
Detection Rate (attack instances) 85% 
Precision 77% 
Sensitivity  85% 
Specificity 67% 
 
From Table 1 the total number of clusters that falls in generic 
attack clusters is 16 and that falls in generic normal cluster is 4. 
The converged SOM is than tested with the training instances. 
With the standard testing test of NSL-KDD dataset, the 
detection accuracy as shown in Table 1 is 85%. However, we 
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would like to restate that the objective of the work in not to 
improve detection accuracy but to discover if a learning-based 
IDS can be influenced externally. With this objective packet 
were framed that seemed normal but eventually in the long run 
may lead to an attack. Attributes whose value can be 
influenced externally are already mentioned in Figure 10. 
 
Table 2: Implementation results after one attribute poison 
 
Number of training instances 3000 + 1500(poison) 
Execution time with mentioned 
hardware and software details 
35 hours 
Total cluster into which weight 
vectors of SOM is clustered 
20 
 
Cluster indices that are part of attack. 
Each cluster consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[1,2,4,7,10,12,14] 
Cluster indices that are part of 
normal. Each cluster consists a set of 
weight vectors of the SOM grid. 
[0,3,4,5,6,8,9,11,13] 
Detection Rate (attack instances) 83% 
False Positive Rate  28% 
Precision 78% 
Sensitivity  83% 
Specificity 71% 
 
Fig. 11. 3D plane of the BMU falling in different clusters [After poison 
learning with four random manipulated normal attributes with attack set 
values.] 
 
Table 3: Implementation results after four attribute poison learning [attack 
vector attributes with normal value set].  
 
Number of training instances 3000 + 1500(poison) 
Execution time with 
mentioned hardware and 
software details 
34 hours 
Total cluster into which 
weight vectors of SOM is 
clustered 
20 
Cluster indices that are part 
of attack. Each cluster 
consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,
15,18,19] 
Cluster indices that are part 
of normal. Each cluster 
consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[2,18,15] 
Detection Rate (attack 
instances) 
92% 
False Positive Rate  83% 
Precision 59% 
Sensitivity  92% 
Specificity 16% 
 
Table 4: Crafted packets are classified as normal by the learned IDS as result 
portrays no BMU falls in the Attack Cluster. 
 
Number of training instances 1500 
Total cluster into which 
weight vectors of SOM is 
clustered 
20 
Cluster indices that are part 
of attack. Each cluster 
consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[] 
Cluster indices that are part 
of normal. Each cluster 
consists a set of weight 
vectors of the SOM grid. 
[0,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17,18,19] 
Detection Rate (attack 
instances) 
100% 
False Positive Rate  0% 
Precision 100% 
Sensitivity  100% 
Specificity 100% 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the result after injecting the IDS with 
1500 poison instances, i.e. attributes values are modified in 
such manner that the IDS classify them initially as normal and 
eventually these instances become part of future training by 
the learning algorithm. It is observed that there have been 
altogether reorientation of the weight vectors falling into 
normal and attack clusters. The accuracy results have dropped 
from 85% to 83% as found from the experiment. This 
indicates that an attacker can externally influence an online 
learning and thereby bring the future classification result of an 
online IDS down. Table 3 displays the result of similar 
experiment repeated but with higher number of tampered 
attributes values. Table 4 demonstrates the result of the 
classification by the IDS of the instances that are 
programmatically crafted that seemingly are normal but are 
poison instances. When these instances are injected to the IDS 
for classification, it is observed that the clusters of BMU 
falling in the generic attack cluster is empty and therefore all 
the instances are treated normal and therefore, becomes part of 
future training. The detection rate is 100% indicating all the 
crafted instances are very well recognized as normal by the 
detection engine of the IDS. Citing as an example one attribute 
value of crafted instances that was incrementally changed was 
dst_host_host_count: Number of connections from the same 
host to the destination in the past 2 seconds. 
 
Table 5: Classification result of a normal SVM 
 
Number of training instances 10000 
Detection rate (attack instances) 100% 
Precision 100% 
Sensitivity 100% 
  
We kept all other feature values (as per NSL-KDD) of a 
packet same as that of a normal packet but kept slowly rising 
in linear pattern the value of the above attribute. It is later 
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observed that the IDS eventually started to fail recognizing 
DoS (Denial of Service) attack in form of SYN flood 
performed from a single machine to a target destination. The 
IDS started classifying all of them eventually as normal 
packets. This signifies that an attacker can plan very carefully 
to bypass detection of a specific attack by an online IDS. 
Apart from testing this behavior with online based IDS using 
SOM as the classification tool, we also tested it with SVM 
(Support Vector Machine). Support Vector Machines have 
proven effective in classification of high dimensional data 
with significantly bigger training instances and attributes. 
SVM is trained with training set from NSL-KDD Dataset. The 
implementation of SVM on training samples exhibits high 
accuracy i.e. the SVM perfectly classifies the training and the 
testing instances. Ten thousand samples from NSL-KDD 
dataset were adopted for training the SVM. Table 5 
summarizes the result of the output of the SVM. The learned 
SVM is tested on the NSL-KDD testing set. As seen from 
Table 5, with zero false positive or false negative the detection 
comes to 100%. 
 Figure 7 shows the support vectors plotted in a normal 
SVM trained on NSL-KDD dataset using linear kernel. 
 
 
Fig 7: Support vectors in a normal SVM using linear kernel 
 
It is observed from Figure 7 that none of the support vectors 
are misclassified. Therefore, the detection rate is high. 
Different colours of the panel represents instances falling to 
different clusters. The support vectors are labeled in the figure. 
Fig 7 shows the SVM plot with a linear kernel.  
 
 
Fig 8: Support vectors in a normal SVM using polynomial kernel 
 
Figure 8 shows the support vectors plotted using a polynomial 
kernel and Figure 9 shows the support vectors plotted using a 
radial basis function. It has been observed in all the SVM 
plotted figures that none of the testing instances are 
misclassified and the detection rate really goes well because of 
large size in the feature set as can be seen from Table 5. 
However, when the SVM is trained using poison instances as 
discussed before, the support vector changes as shown in 
Figure 10 from that of support vectors shown in Figure 7. The 
accuracy of detection rate drops below 100%. This is vivid by 
the number of misclassified support vectors as can be seen 
from Figure 10. In normal SVM as seen in Figure 7, there 
were no misclassified support vectors and therefore high 
detection accuracy. 
 
 
Fig 9: Support vectors in a normal SVM using radial basis function 
 
 
Table 6: Support vector set in normal trained linear kernel based SVM 
 
False Positive/False 
Negative 
('TP', 0, 'TN', 500, 'FP', 0, 'FN', 0) 
Support vector in the 
first class 
[5 1] 
Support vector in the 
second class 
[ 63 282 461 588 681 0] 
 
 
 
Fig 10: Support vectors in SVM learned using poison (manually crafted) 
instances using linear kernel 
 
Similarly, the misclassification in SVM using polynomial 
kernel can be seen in Figure 11 as that from Figure 8. 
Likewise, misclassification error of support vector in SVM 
using radial basis function can be observed in Figure 12 from 
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that of Figure 9. As can be seen from Table 6, the support 
vectors either falls in one of the class i.e. in generic Attack or 
Normal. As can be seen from the table two number of support 
vectors falls in the first class and six number of support 
vectors falls in the second class. As described earlier, the 
framed instances are crafted keeping resemblance with the 
attack set vectors of NSL KDD set. However, significant 
changes in indices of support vector set compared to support 
vectors in normal SOM is observed.  
 
 
Fig 11: Support vectors in SVM learned using poison instances using 
polynomial kernel 
 
 
Fig 12: Support vectors in SVM learned using poison 
instances using radial basis function 
 
The plot of linear indices of support vectors can be seen in 
Figure 13. The density of these linear indices changes in SVM 
poisoned with single and multiple attributes as can be seen in 
Figure 14 and 15 respectively. 
  
Table 7: Support vector set in one attribute poisoned trained with linear kernel 
based SVM 
 
('TP', 0, 'TN', 500, 'FP', 0, 'FN', 0) 
Support vector class - [8(first class), 1(second class)] 
Support vector indices set --- [100 113 179 216 390 481 605 610   0] 
 
Table 8: Support vector set in four attributes poisoned trained with linear 
kernel based SVM 
 
('TP', 0, 'TN', 500, 'FP', 0, 'FN', 0) 
Support vector class -[7(first class), 1(second class)] 
Support vector indices set --[128 177 292 356 419 787 885   0] 
 
This indicates that the behavior of the learning can be 
influenced by carefully crafting packets that may seem normal 
but can be a potential attack in the long run. The number of 
support vectors belonging to a given class also changes 
significantly. 
 
 
 
Fig 13: In scale of 1000 [x, y axis], indices of support vectors in normal 
training instances. 
 
 
 
Fig 14: In scale of 1000 [x, y axis], Indices of support vectors after poison 
learning with one random manipulated normal attribute with attack set values 
  
 
 
Fig 15: In scale of 1000 [x, y axis], Indices of support vectors after poison 
learning with four random manipulated normal attributes with attack set 
values 
8. MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK  
The mathematical formulation portraying the deviation in the 
learning with newly injected normal and poison packets can be 
derived as below: 
Y - inclusion rate of learning instances for normal learning; 
L - unaffected Learning, ɑ - infectivity rate on learning by 
malicious instances; X - set of previous malicious instances (if 
any) already part of the learning set; β -  error rate in the non-
tampered learning; The rate of change in the learning (gradual 
inclination towards poison learning) can be formulated as 
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follows: dL/dt = Y - ɑLX - βL. The following equation 
indicates how much influence the instances that actually 
“attack” mode but are classified as normal and became part of 
future learning set that can further influence the learning: 
dE/dt = ɑLX - (λ + θ)E  
 
9. CLASS IMBALANCE IN TRAINING SET 
 
Most of the machine learning algorithms are subjected to 
imbalance problem [55,56]. There have been work to address 
the imbalance problem by different researchers [57,58]. The 
experiment and evaluation demonstrated in this paper is not in 
relation to class imbalance problem during the training. The 
training data generated in the experimental evaluation is free 
of class imbalance problem. While generating the training set 
almost an approximate equal number of labelled instances 
from each of attack and normal set were considered. It was 
also done in keeping in mind not to make the learning 
algorithm victim of overfitting problem. To ensure the same 
Tomek links [51] was considered. Therefore, no two examples 
were considered that formed Tomek links. 
 
10. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO OVERCOME THE 
OBSERVED PROBLEM 
 
Training data manipulation: From the experimental evaluation 
it is observed that the anomaly in the true classification is due 
to incorporation of instances in the future learning set that are 
otherwise classified as normal but may lead to poison learning 
in the long run. Whenever, an incoming instance is classified 
as normal rather than embedding this instance immediately as 
a part of future training set, these instances are made part of a 
temporary set. When the size of this temporary set is large the 
instances of the set are made part of the training set and the 
learning is made to reoccur again on this training set. Once the 
learning is converged, the learning algorithm is run on 
randomly picked samples from testing set of NSL-KDD 
dataset.  If the detection rate drops below compared to the rate 
recorded before the temporary set is made part of training set, 
the instances of the temporary set are ignored. Therefore, the 
new training set remains same as the old training set i.e. 
If detection_ratenew < detection_rateold: 
training_set_new = training_set_old; 
Else: 
training_set_new(future training set)= 
training_set_old + temporary_set;  
 
Certain methods such as RONI [52] have been proposed in 
certain context such as spam classification of emails in 
relevance to training data manipulation. However, in this 
aspect RONI approach might fail or prove computationally 
more intensive. The above proposed idea of temporary set 
approach would prove effective and less computationally 
intensive as the learning would not be invoked with every new 
instance. However, the degree of such efficiency would be 
considered in the future study and experimental evaluation. 
11. CONCLUSION 
The above experiments demonstrate that it is possible to 
influence the classification behaviour of an online based IDS 
by systematically changing certain attribute values of a packet 
feature set. Experimental evaluation shows that the detection 
accuracy of the online IDS declines after subjected to poison 
packet attacks. The experimental evaluation is significant in 
the sense that it gives an understanding of the necessary steps 
to be adopted for online learning-based IDS for safe and 
secure learning. It can be therefore concluded that machine 
learning algorithms are never blindly secure and leave a scope 
for analysis of such algorithms under different circumstances 
[47]. If the attacker has some idea of the attributes used for 
training purpose, he can play around with self-crafted 
instances with different values for those attributes for 
deviating the classification behavior of the learning algorithm. 
This work further motivates to pick up the responsive behavior 
of a Network subject to attack. One of such work undertaken 
can be found in [48]. It is also observed that people have tried 
to devise a different approach to achieve security at different 
times [49, 50]. Therefore, there always exist an enthusiasm 
among security researcher to design IDS/IPS or responsive 
system that can ensure minimum casualty to the network and 
organization. The experimental evaluation leaves another 
scope of designing a bioinspired response system of a network 
to withstand unseen attacks. 
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